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ABSTRACT
Fast and effective unsupervised anomaly detection algorithms have
been proposed for categorical data based on the minimum descrip-
tion length (MDL) principle. However, they can be ineffective when
detecting anomalies in heterogeneous datasets representing a mix-
ture of different sources, such as security scenarios in which system
and user processes have distinct behavior patterns. We propose a
meta-algorithm for enhancing any MDL-based anomaly detection
model to deal with heterogeneous data by fitting a mixture model
to the data, via a variant of k-means clustering. Our experimental
results show that using a discrete mixture model provides com-
petitive performance relative to two previous anomaly detection
algorithms, while mixtures of more sophisticated models yield fur-
ther gains, on both synthetic datasets and realistic datasets from a
security scenario.
1 INTRODUCTION
A wide variety of anomaly detection techniques have been studied,
considering numerical, categorical, and mixed data [8]. Anomaly
detection, or outlier detection, is based on different strategies for es-
timating the degree to which individual data points differ from the
norm exhibited by the dataset as a whole. This challenge is usually
compounded by the fact that annotated training data indicating
whether data items are normal or abnormal may be unavailable,
unbalanced, or unrepresentative of future observations. For exam-
ple, in a security setting, past attacks may not be representative
of future yet-to-be-invented attacks, and attack data is typically
sparse, so training an accurate binary classifier is likely to either
overfit to the past attacks, or suffer low accuracy against known
attacks. We consider unsupervised anomaly detection.
Most work on unsupervised anomaly detection has focused on
continuous, numerical data. In this paper, we focus on categorical
data, for which several different techniques have been studied [24].
One of the most effective classes of techniques is based on the
minimum description length (MDL) principle [10]. According to the
MDL principle, we measure how well a model fits the data by how
well it compresses the data, plus a cost associated with representing
the model itself. The idea is to avoid overfitting by trading off
model complexity for accuracy: for example, in the limit, a model
that contains a dictionary listing each possible data value would
compress the data very well, but be penalized highly for model
complexity, since the model contains a copy of all of the different
possible values of data records. In the MDL-based approach to
anomaly detection [2, 21], we first apply MDL to select a “good”
model of the data, and then use the compressed size of each data
item as its anomaly score.
Two examples of anomaly detection based on MDL have been
studied and shown to perform well: the OC3 algorithm [21] based
on an itemset mining technique called Krimp [26], and the Com-
preX algorithm [2]. Broadly speaking, both take a similar approach:
first, a model H of the data that compresses it well is found using a
heuristic search, balancing the model complexity L(H ) (number of
bits required to compress the model structure/parameters) against
the data complexity L(X |H ) (number of bits required to compress
the data given the model). Once such a model H is found, we as-
sign to each object x ∈ X a score corresponding to the object’s
compressed size L(x |H ) given the selected model. Intuitively, if the
model accurately characterizes the data as a whole, records that are
representative will compress well, yielding a low anomaly score,
while anomalous or abnormal records should compress poorly. If
this were not the case, then a more accurate model (compressing
the data better) could be obtained by giving the normal records
shorter codes and anomalous records longer codes.
While effective, these approaches have some limitations. They
work well for homogeneous datasets, for which it is reasonable to
assume that there is a single process that generates the observed
data. However, the compression models they consider take no ac-
count of the possibility that the data represents amixture of records
generated by different data sources. If the data is heterogeneous,
there may be further opportunities for compressing it more effec-
tively, by choosing among several different models instead of using
a single one.
We illustrate the potential benefits of mixture modeling using
geometric intuition. Figure 1 illustrates some data points in a two-
dimensional space, with three large clusters (a,b,c), and a small
cluster (d). If we consider a single model of the data, the “center”
of the dataset (illustrated with a star) is closest to the points (d),
while points (a,b,c) are approximately equidistant. Thus, if we used
distance from the center as an anomaly score, it would be difficult
to distinguish the anomalous cluster from the three main clusters.
If, on the other hand, we recognize that most of the data fall into
three main clusters, then we would see that the points (d) are not
close to any of these clusters, even though they are close to the
average behavior of the dataset as a whole.
We have emulated this situation in a categorical setting by gen-
erating synthetic data with 1000 samples drawn from three discrete
distributions corresponding to the large clusters (a,b,c), and seeding
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Figure 1: Geometric intuition
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Figure 2: Results of (a) pure and (b) mixture modeling for
anomaly detection in synthetic data. Red vertical lines in-
dicate anomalies, while the black vertical line indicates the
average codelength.
just three data points for the anomalous cluster (d), whose distri-
bution is the average of the three clusters. The results are shown
in Figure 2. In this synthetic dataset, fitting a single MDL model
to the data (as shown in Figure 2a) results in the seeded anomalies
being detected at ranks 35, 1315 and 1655, and two of the anom-
alies have scores close to the average. On the other hand, fitting a
mixture model yields compression savings of over 30%, indicating
the mixture model is much more likely to be correct according to
the MDL principle, and ranks the seeded anomalies at positions 17,
42 and 109. (These results were generated using the AVC and AVC∗
algorithms described later in the paper.) Note that this approach
can be viewed (at least in spirit) as a form of outlier ensembling [1];
however, to the best of our knowledge there has been no previ-
ous work on ensembling anomaly detectors based on minimum
description length.
In this paper, we propose an MDL-based anomaly detection tech-
nique that exploits this opportunity to detect and exploit hetero-
geneities in datasets to improve anomaly detection. Our approach is
partly inspired by work using Krimp for clustering [25]. This work
proposed both top-down and bottom-up clustering strategies, using
Krimp’s compression metric to assess the quality of clusters, and
comparing the quality of clusterings obtained for different values of
k . They found up to 40% improvement in compressed size. The top-
down algorithm they presented is similar to the k-means algorithm
for clustering numerical data [6], and is similar to other MDL-based
clustering algorithms [13]. They observed this approach generalizes
to any MDL-based technique but did not explore this insight or
consider applications to anomaly detection.
Based on this observation, we consider the value of MDL-based
clustering as a basis for anomaly detection. Essentially, the idea is
to first identify a clustering for the data (and, in the process, assign
each data item to the most appropriate cluster). Next, a score is
assigned to each data item based on combining the cost of com-
pressing its cluster number, together with the cost of compressing
the data itself using the corresponding model. Both components
would be required to decompress the data, since, without the cluster
number, the receiver would not know which basic model to use to
decompress the data.
In this paper, we consider several instances of this idea. Our
main contribution is to demonstrate that clustering techniques
can improve the anomaly detection performance of a variety of
MDL-based models. After introducing notation and a framework
for MDL algorithms (Section 2), we consider a naive MDL-based
anomaly detection technique called AVC, which is a slight variant
of the AVF algorithm [14] in which the data is fit to a product of
independent Bernoulli distributions. We consider AVC, Krimp/OC3,
and CompreX as instances of the MDL framework, and describe a
meta-algorithm that uses a clustering strategy to fit a mixture model
to the data (Section 3). We then present experimental evaluation
(Section 4) using common datasets as well as data from a realistic
security setting which demonstrates that clustering can improve
anomaly detection performance (measured using AUC or nDCG
score) significantly, while also imposing higher computational cost.
Interestingly, the benefits of clustering are much more significant
for AVC compared to Krimp/OC3 or CompreX, illustrating that the
more sophisticated compression techniques used by the latter are
already flexible enough to deal with heterogeneous data. In some
cases, clustering using mixtures of AVC models actually outper-
forms (mixtures of) Krimp or CompreX models, while also being
faster.
2 BACKGROUND
We assume familiarity with basics of information theory and the
MDL principle [9, 10]. We consider the following framework for
selecting and fitting models to data according to the MDL principle.
(We employ what Grünwald [10] calls “two part crude MDL”, which
is well-behaved when large amounts of data are available.) We
consider an MDL scenario to be specified as follows:
• A space of observations X
• A space of hypotheses H ∈ H
• A global hypothesis codelength function L : H → R satisfy-
ing the Kraft inequality
∑
H ∈H 2−L(H ) ≤ 1.
• A function L(−|−) : X ×H → R, such that for each hypoth-
esis H the associated codelength function x 7→ L(x |H ) takes
a data item x ∈ X to its compressed size, again satisfying the
Kraft inequality
∑
x ∈X 2−L(x |H ) ≤ 1.
Given aMDL scenario (X ,H ,L), a learner is an algorithm F : Xn →
H that attempts to findH minimizing L(H )+∑ni=1 L(xi |H ). It is not
required that a learner finds a global optimum Hmin; we also allow
for F to be nondeterministic or randomized. Familiar probability dis-
tributions, with their associated parameter estimation techniques,
provide a ready source of MDL-based learning techniques, but our
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framework also permits viewing any family of compression algo-
rithms (indexed by hypotheses corresponding to parameterizations,
code tables, etc.) as an MDL-based learning technique.
For the purpose of this paper we assume the size of the dataset
under consideration is a fixed constant n.
Uniform processes. As a simple case we consider the trivial MDL
scenarioUX corresponding to a uniform probability distribution
over a finite set X . In this case, there is only one hypothesis, ⋆, rep-
resenting the uniform distribution, and the hypothesis codelength
function is L(⋆) = 0, while the observation codelength function is
L(ci |⋆) = − log( 1|X | ) = log |X |.
Bernoulli processes. We consider Bernoulli processes, generating
0,1 values, specified by a probability p of generating a 1 and 1−p of
generating a 0. The hypotheses we might seek to learn about such a
process are the probabilities p; to avoid degeneracy we require 0 <
p < 1. To avoid having to specify real numbers infinitely precisely,
we consider precision to ⌊logn⌋ bits, where n is the number of
data items under consideration. We represent a hypothesis asm
interpreted as a rational number m/n where 0 ≤ m ≤ n. The
codelength of such a hypothesis is L(m) = ⌊logn⌋, we encodem
using ⌊logn⌋ bits.
Given a sequence of n independent 0/1 values we may estimate
p = n[1]/nwheren[1] is the number of 1’s occurring in the sequence.
This choice would be optimal, if we wish to compress the sequence
minimizing the sum
∑n
i=1 L(x i |H ) so that there is no need to deal
with data values that were not observed in the input. However, this
leads to degeneracy in the case where some value never appears in
the input, which means that future observations of unseen values
have probability 0, and hence infinite codelength. To avoid this
problem, we generally apply a so-called Laplace correction to the
counts, by taking p = (n[1]+1)/(n+2) to ensure that both outcomes
have nonzero probability.
Thus, the codelength of a 0 or 1 value x is − logp if x = 1 and
− log(1 − p) otherwise; we may write this concisely as L(x |H ) =
−[x = 1] logp − [x = 0] log(1 − p), where p = (m + 1)/(n + 2) is
derived fromH = (m,n) as above. (Wewrite [ϕ] for 0 ifϕ is false and
1 ifϕ is true.) Finally, we take the learning function F : {0, 1}∗ →H
to be
F (x1, . . . ,xn ) =
n∑
i=1
x i
Categorical processes. We can generalize the above discussion of
two-valued Bernoulli processes to k-valued categorical processes
Ck . A categorical distribution over k outcomes 1, . . . ,k is specified
by the k probabilities p1, . . . ,pk of the different outcomes, up to
precision ⌊logn⌋; since one of them is redundant, the data of a hy-
pothesis is given by (m1, . . . ,mk−1) and the associated codelength
L(H ) = (k − 1)⌊logn⌋. From this, we may extract p1, . . . ,pk by
taking pi = (mi + 1)/(n + k) where i < k and pk = 1 −
∑
i<k pi ,
again applying Laplace correction to avoid degeneracy. Further-
more we may encode a given outcome x according to hypothesis
H as
∑k
j=1 −[x = j] logpj .
Finally the learning function that identifies the best hypothesis
for the data is:
F (x1, . . . ,xn ) = (
n∑
i−=1
[x i = 1], . . . ,
n∑
i=1
[x i = k − 1])
Independent products. Given twoMDL scenariosX = (X ,H1,L1)
and Y = (Y ,H2,L2), we can combine them independently to form
a scenario over pairs (x ,y) ∈ X ×Y by taking a product X×Y. The
hypothesesH = H1 ×H2 for the product are pairs of hypotheses
for X and Y. The hypothesis codelength function is defined by
taking sums of codelengths: L(H1,H2) = L1(H1) + L2(H2). The
data codelength function is also defined by taking sums, using the
respective hypotheses: L((x ,y)|(H1,H2)) = L1(x |H1) + L2(y |H2).
Finally, given learning functions F1, F2 for X and Y respectively,
the learner function F is defined as:
F ((x1,y1), . . . , (xn ,yn )) = (F1(x1, . . . ,xn ), F2(y1, . . . ,yn ))
Likewise, we can also consider n-ary products
∏n
i=1 Xi = X1 ×· · · Xm whose behavior is determined by iterating binary products.
3 MDL-BASED ANOMALY DETECTION
We now consider several instances of the above framework and
their use for anomaly detection. In each case, we follow the same
recipe as proposed in previous work [2, 21]: first induce a good
model of the data according to the MDL principle, that compresses
the dataset as a whole; then assign each element an anomaly score
corresponding to its compressed size using the model. We can then
inspect the highest-scoring data items as being the most anomalous.
The first instance of this framework, called Attribute Value Com-
pression (AVC), is a slight variation of a known anomaly detection
algorithm called Attribute Value Frequency (AVF) [14], but is based
on optimal compression of each attribute independently. Thus, it
is limited in that it cannot exploit interdependencies among at-
tributes. Next, we recast the Krimp/OC3 and CompreX algorithms
as instances of the above framework, though we abstract over the
details. Finally, we describe a generic strategy (i.e. a meta-algorithm)
for learning mixtures of MDL hypotheses, given a basic learner
such as AVC, Krimp or CompreX. Given a learner F for compo-
nent models, the meta-algorithm produces a learner for k-mixture
models F ∗, using the MDL principle to find a suitable value for k .
3.1 Basic models
Attribute Value Coding. Given a binary or categorical dataset
withm attributes X1, . . . ,Xm , each corresponding to a Bernoulli
or categorical process, we define the Attribute Value Coding algo-
rithm as the learner induced by taking the product of the optimal
learners for the components X1, . . . ,Xm . Concretely, FAVC calcu-
lates the frequencies of the values of each attribute independently
and LAVC (x1, . . . ,xm |H ) then encodes each attribute xi with code-
length− logpi wherepi is the probability of attribute i having value
xi . For example, when the attributes are all binary, the probabilities
first calculated as pi = 1n
∑n
j=1 x
j
i and the score of each element x
is L(x |H ) = ∑mj=1 −([x j = 1] logpj + [x j = 0] log(1 − pj )).
Example 3.1. Here, we introduce a small (extremely simplistic)
running example to illustrate AVC. Suppose we have the following
dataset:
id abc.com xyz.com evil.com
P17 1 1 0
P42 1 1 0
P1337 0 0 1
P007 1 1 1
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where P17, P42, P1337, P007 are four distinct processes and abc .com,
xyz.com and evil .com, three attributes corresponding to network ad-
dresses accessed by the processes.
P17 and P42 access both abc.com and xyz.com and are both pro-
cesses with innocuous activity while P1337 and P007 are malicious
processes (P1337 a naive attacker that only accesses evil.com and
P007 a more sophisticated attacker that accesses all three addresses in
order to attempt to camouflage its behavior).
To calculate the AVC score of each of the processes and determine
which exhibit abnormal behavior, we first compute the frequencies
of occurrence (ci , with i ∈ {abc .com,xyz.com, evil .com}) of each of
the three dataset attributes followed by the probability pi of each of
the attributes having value xi (where xi is either 0 or 1):
cabc.com = cxyz.com = 3 and cevil.com = 2
pabc.com=1 = pxyz.com=1 =
3
4 and pevil.com=1 =
1
2
(the probabilities can be estimated simply by taking pi =
ci
n where n
is the number of data points i.e. processes here)
The AVC scores are then simply calculated as follows:
AVC(P17) = − 13 (log 34 + log 34 + log 12 ) ≈ 0.61
AVC(P42) = − 13 (log 34 + log 34 + log 12 ) ≈ 0.61
AVC(P1337) = − 13 (log 14 + log 14 + log 12 ) ≈ 1.66
AVC(P007) = − 13 (log 34 + log 34 + log 12 ) ≈ 0.61
We term this approach “Attribute Value Coding” because it is
very similar to a previously-defined anomaly detection technique
called “Attribute Value Frequency” (AVF) [14]. The main difference
is that, in AVF, we sum the probabilities of each attribute attaining
its observed value, not the log-probabilities (i.e. codelengths); hence,
AVF does not have a direct reading as anMDL technique, while AVC
does. Because AVF scores do not correspond to compressed sizes,
it would be meaningless to attempt to use them as a component
in a larger MDL-based compression strategy such as the one we
propose based on clustering.
Krimp. We will also consider the Krimp algorithm as an MDL
scenario and learner. In Krimp, a (binary) dataset is compressed by
identifying certain subsets of frequently co-occurring attributes.
Concretely, in Krimp, the dataset is to be represented by a code table
CT which lists the possible subsets and their codelengths, and then
each data item is represented by a set of codewords called its cover,
so that the length L(x |CT ) = ∑y∈coverCT (x ) length(y).
In Krimp, a candidate collection of itemsets is mined from the
data using standard techniques. The mined itemsets are considered
as candidate entries to a code table; those that are useful in improv-
ing compression are selected. Krimp performs a heuristic search to
try to find a code table that minimizes the compressed size of the
data. Different pruning strategies are used to remove candidates
which are less effective. The exact details of the search and pruning
algorithms do not play an important role here as we will use them
as a black box.
However, what is important is that we can assign a cost L(CT ) to
the code table itself (that is, the number of bits necessary to record
or communicate it) and we can assign a cost L(x |CT ) to each data
item given a code table (that is, the number of bits necessary to
communicate a given data item, using a certain code table). These
codelengths satisfy the Kraft inequality.
In the MDL scenario corresponding to Krimp, the hypotheses are
Krimp’s code tablesCT , and the codelength functionsL(CT ),L(−|CT )
are as defined in previous papers [21, 26]. We write FKrimp for the
Krimp algorithm itself, which selects among the (huge number of)
potential code tables one which performs well in balancing the
hypothesis codelength against the encoded size of the data.
CompreX. We will also describe how to model the CompreX
algorithm and its MDL scenario. In CompreX, as in Krimp, code
tables are used. However, in CompreX, instead of using a single
global code table, the input attributes are partitioned and one code
table is assigned to encode the attributes in each component of
the partition. Thus, the hypotheses H = (P ,CT1, . . . ,CTp ) consist
of a partition P = {P1, . . . , Pp } of the attributes, along with one
code table for each partition. A hypothesis codelength function
L(H ) is described in the paper [2] using Krimp’s L(CT ) together
with an encoding of partitions, and the codelength function for
data elements given a hypothesis is derived by adding together the
codelengths of the attributes in each part:
L(x |H ) =
p∑
i=1
L(πPi (x)|CTi )
where πPi (x) is the projection of the attributes of x to the subset Pi .
Note that once the partition is given, this is essentially a product of
Krimp MDL scenarios.
Unlike Krimp, CompreX follows a bottom-up strategy for syn-
thesizing code tables: initially the partition consists of singleton
attributes only and the associated code tables are trivial. Using
information gain as a heuristic, CompreX greedily merges partition
elements and combines their code tables. Itemset mining is not di-
rectly performed; nevertheless, CompreX was found to obtain good
compression compared to Krimp, indicating that many datasets
may contain subsets of highly-correlated attributes for which Com-
preX’s partitioning strategy works well. We write FCompreX for
CompreX considered as an MDL learner algorithm, relative to an
appropriate MDL scenario.
3.2 Mixture models
We assume given a basic MDL scenario X = (X ,H ,L) and learner
F for fitting hypotheses to the data. As mentioned by [25], any such
technique can be used as a component in a k-means-style clustering
technique, which can again be justified by the MDL principle. In
this section, we spell out the details in a way that is independent of
the choice of X and F .
Given the MDL scenario X = (X ,H ,L), we can construct a new
scenario X∗ called the X-mixture model as follows:
• The observations X are those of X.
• The hypotheses correspond toK-mixture models of hypothe-
sesH , for all positive K . These are tuples (K ,H , ®Hi ), where
H is a hypothesis for the K possible components specified by
Ck = ({1, . . . ,K},HK ,LK ), theK-valued categorical process
model and the K hypotheses H1, . . . ,HK ∈ H characterize
each component.
• Define the encoding for a hypothesis (K ,H , ®Hi ) asL∗(K ,H , ®Hi ) =
⌊logn⌋ + LK (H ) +∑ki=1 L(Hi ). That is, we encode K (which
takes at most ⌊logn⌋ bits), then the hypothesis for the class
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labels H (using the codelength function from CK ), and fi-
nally the K hypotheses for the data for each class (using the
hypothesis codelength function from X).
• Define the encoding for each data valuex asL∗(x |(K ,H , ®Hi )) =
mini ∈{1, ...,K } LK (i |H ) + L(x |Hi ).
We write X∗ for the MDL scenario specified above, and call it the
mixture of X models.
Intuitively, this scenario corresponds to the following (nondeter-
ministic) compression algorithm: we guess K , a distribution over K
class labels, and K hypotheses corresponding to the K components
existing in the data. We encode this information and transmit it to
the receiver. Subsequently, each data value x can then be transmit-
ted by first encoding the class label i for x (using the hypothesis
H describing the distribution of class labels), then transmitting x
itself using the hypothesis Hi .
This nondeterministic algorithm suggests an optimal (but infeasi-
ble) compression algorithm: given datax ∈ X ∗, find amixturemodel
hypothesis that yields the optimal codelength L(H∗)+L(x |H∗) given
the above scenario. Of course, this naive approach is infeasible since,
even if we know an efficient optimal learner for the components
X, finding the optimal mixture model parameters (equivalently,
the optimal clustering minimizing the codelength) might require
considering all of the possible partitions. The number of partitions
of n is the Bell number Bn which grows very rapidly (e.g. B20 > 50
trillion).
However, just as for conventional clustering, an iterative greedy
approach can be effective, following a similar strategy to the classic
k-means clustering algorithm. We outline such a strategy below,
which is largely the same as in [25]; the main difference is that we
use an optimal code for the class labels, instead of ignoring the
codelength of the class labels as they do.
The mixture model fitting process is a variant of the K-means
clustering algorithm, but using MDL hypotheses to represent the
clusters, and with codelength assigned to a point by a given cluster
playing a role analogous to the distance metric in K-means. To find
the right k , we start with k = 1 and increase it until we have found
a local minimum. (In practice, we typically detect when increasing
k yields diminishing returns, and stop early, since trying all k up
to n would be prohibitively expensive.) Similarly to k-means, in
each iteration, we alternate between estimating the component
models based on the current candidate clustering (line 5 in Algo-
rithm 1), and reassigning points to clusters (line 6 in Algorithm 1).
However, instead of taking the “mean” of a set of points, which is
meaningless for categorical data, we represent a set of points using
a hypothesis and we calculate the “distance” of each point as its
(idealized) compressed size, were it to be compressed using that hy-
pothesis. The hypotheses may be simple AVC models, Krimp code
tables, CompreX hypotheses, or those of any other MDL scenario.
Likewise, we might consider different models for the class labels;
we have in mind compressing the class labels optimally according
to the observed distribution of classes, but we could also fix the
uniform distributionUX (which would give the same behavior as
the clustering algorithm of van Leeuwen et al. [25]), where the cost
of encoding the class label is ignored; this has the same effect as
assuming the class labels all have the same codelength.)
According to line 8 of Algorithm 1, we repeat this process until
convergence to a local minimum. Several techniques for detecting
Algorithm 1:Mixture model fitting algorithm
Input: a dataset ®x
Output: An X∗ hypothesis (K ,H , ®Hi )
1 k = 1;
2 while k ≤ n do
3 Randomly assign each x i to one of k classes. Let yi be the
initial class of each x i ;
4 repeat
5 Run Hj := FX({x i | yi = j}) to calculate the
hypothesis for each class;
6 Re-assign each xi to the class j minimizing L(x i |Hj ),
setting yi to j;
7 Evaluate c := L∗(K ,H , ®Hi )+∑ni=1 L∗(x i |(K ,H , ®Hi ), the
cost of the current hypothesis;
8 until a local minimum ck is reached;
9 Set k := k + 1;
10 end
11 Return the hypothesis (k,H , ®Hi ) achieving minimal ck .
convergence are possible; we fix some small ϵ > 0 and iterate
until the total compressed size fails to improve by more than ϵ
times the previous size. We may also conduct several trials with
different random initializations and take the result that minimizes
the compressed size.
Now, to find the best k , we consider a range of k values and fit a
model with k components for each k . Suppose we have constructed
modelsM1, . . . ,Mn for all possible k values between 1 and n. We
choose k to be the one for which L(Mk )+L(X |M) is minimized. Of
course, it would likely be wasteful to fit models again and again so,
by fixing some ϵ , we may terminate the process early if increasing
k fails to result in a better fit. In practice, we usually consider k
values up to some relatively small number, since n is usually very
large.
3.3 Anomaly detection
LetH be the best hypothesis found by the above procedure for some
MDL scenario X. To perform anomaly scoring we simply assign
each x its codelength L(x |H ). Because we have required codelength
functions to be nondegenerate (i.e. satisfying the Kraft inequality
for each hypothesis), L(x |H ) is well-defined and finite, even if we
consider records x that were not present in the original dataset.
Since codelength functions satisfying the Kraft inequality corre-
spond to (sub)probability distributions, the records for which the
codelength L(x |H ) are largest are precisely those whose conditional
probability given H are smallest.
4 EVALUATION
4.1 Datasets
We consider several public datasets collected for evaluation of cate-
gorical anomaly detection by Pang [17]. Their characteristics are
summarized in the first few columns of Table 1. The datasets range
in size up to 2k records and between 22–114 attributes, with be-
tween 27 and 60 anomalies. We transformed all datasets to use
binary encodings of multivalued attributes to ensure compatibility
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with Krimp. Most of these datasets are derived from standard clas-
sification datasets by choosing one class to be the normal class and
selecting a few examples of another class to be the anomalies.
We also consider several datasets derived from the DARPA Trans-
parent Computing program, consisting of data about operating sys-
tem processes in a system under attack by an advanced persistent
threat (APT) (see Table 1 lower left for dataset statistics). These
categorical datasets are derived from much larger raw provenance
trace datasets as described by Berrada et al. [4]; we consider only
their ProcessEvent datasets in which each record describes the be-
havior of an operating system process, and the attributes indicate
whether the process ever performed a particular kind of action
(read, write, forking another process, etc.) These datasets contain a
mix of system and user-level processes describing all of the activity
in an operating system. These datasets are drawn from a realistic
security application of anomaly detection, and are mostly larger
and with a smaller percentage of anomalies, and because of the
heterogeneity of the underlying OS processes being recorded we
believe they form a more compelling test for our approach than
the generic datasets. The datasets include two security evaluation
scenarios in which computers running different operating systems
were attacked by simulated APT intruders, usually leading to a very
small percentage of attack processes which we would like to detect
as anomalous.
4.2 Experimental Results
Experimental setup. We implemented AVC and AVC∗ in Python,
using libraries for linear algebra to perform the iterative cluster-
ing steps efficiently. We also implemented Python scripts that run
adapted versions of Krimp/OC3 and CompreX to perform their
clustering variants OC3∗ and CompreX∗. We made minor changes
to publicly available code for Krimp1 and CompreX2 to enable this.
We used the default settings for Krimp, and considered all closed
itemsets. For CompreX, we used the default behavior in the publicly
available Matlab implementation.
All experiments were run on an HP Elitedesk 800 with Intel
i5-6500 CPU and 32GB RAM running Scientific Linux 7.
Evaluation metrics. Following most work on anomaly detection,
we report the AUC score resulting from the ranking induced by
the anomaly scores, i.e. the area under the receiver operator char-
acteristic curve, which summarizes the effectiveness of anomaly
detection at all possible thresholds. For large datasets with very
sparse anomalies, the AUC score is not very informative because
even a very high score such as 0.999 can correspond to all of the
anomalies being found in the top 0.1% of records, but this could still
be useless for actually finding anomalies if the dataset has millions
of records. As a complement to AUC score, we follow [3, 4] in also
reporting the normalized discounted cumulative gain of the rankings,
which is widely used in information retrieval to assess the results
of search algorithms and assigns proportionately greater weight
to rankings that return relevant results (in this case, anomalies)
close to the top. Both nDCG and AUC scores are between 0 and 1,
with 1 representing the best possible result. Their calculations are
1http://eda.mmci.uni-saarland.de/prj/krimp/
2http://eda.mmci.uni-saarland.de/prj/comprex/
otherwise standard and we refer to [4] or other sources for defini-
tions and baseline results using a variety of categorical anomaly
detection algorithms.
Research questions and experiments. We ran experiments intended
to assess the following research questions:
(1) Q1: Can clustering using simple AVC models yield anomaly
detection performance competitive with Krimp or CompreX?
(2) Q2: Can clustering increase the anomaly detection perfor-
mance of Krimp or CompreX?
(3) Q3: Is the performance overhead of clustering acceptable?
To assess Q1, we evaluated the anomaly detection performance
of AVC, Krimp, CompreX, and AVC∗ on the different datasets. The
results are summarized in Table 1. In the case of AVC, Krimp and
CompreX, the reported result is the result of one run since the
result is deterministic. For AVC∗, we ran 10 runs for each dataset
with different random initializations, since k-means algorithms are
sensitive to initial conditions, and we report the median result from
the 10 runs for the k value yielding the smallest compressed sizes.
To assess Q2, we ran AVC∗, OC3∗ and CompreX∗ on all of the
datasets, for different values of k (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 20 for AVC∗ and
OC3∗, but only 1,2,4 for CompreX∗ because the running time was
prohibitive for higher values of k). Figures 3-4 show selected results
from these experiments, plotting relative compressed sizes (bars)
and maximum and median AUC or nDCG scores (green and red
lines) against k values. In this experiment we ran 10 trials of each
algorithm for a fixed value of k and again report medians of AUC
or nDCG scores for the 10 runs. For illustration, we also show the
maximum AUC or nDCG score achieved in each batch of 10 runs
as well as the median; however, in an unsupervised setting we have
no way of knowing in advance which of several runs will produce
this optimal result.
Finally to assess Q3, we report the average running times (again
across 10 runs) of each algorithm on each dataset. These are shown
in Figure 5. The reported running times for AVC, OC3, CompreX,
AVC∗ and OC3∗ are for 10 runs of the full algorithm, considering
all k-values up to 20, with early stopping if a local minimum is
identified early. For CompreX∗ we report only a few examples
for k-values up to 2 or 4 because each run takes over a minute
even for small datasets. In interpreting these results it is important
to keep in mind that each base algorithm was implemented in a
different programming language: AVC in Python (using libraries
such as numpy for efficient matrix manipulations), Krimp in C++,
and CompreX in Matlab. Moreover, the wrapper Python code for
AVC∗, OC3∗, and CompreX∗ may contribute to higher overhead for
these algorithms (for example due to repeated process startup costs)
compared to a single-language implementation. Nevertheless, these
results allow at least a coarse qualitative comparison among the
different techniques.
4.3 Discussion
Effectiveness of AVC∗ compared to OC3 and CompreX. The re-
sults in Table 1 show that generally, AVC is not competitive with
Krimp/OC3 or CompreX, with the interesting exception of the
Probe dataset. However, when we consider mixtures of AVC mod-
els in AVC∗, anomaly detection performance increases significantly,
leading to the best overall results in 10 cases, compared to 13 for
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Table 1: (Left) Dataset characteristics (N=number of records,M=number of attributes, %Anomaly = percentage of anomalies).
(Right) AUC and nDCG scores for Krimp, CompreX, AVC and AVC∗. The best score of each kind is highlighted in bold.
Krimp CompreX AVC AVC∗
Dataset N M %Anomaly AUC nDCG AUC nDCG AUC nDCG AUC nDCG
AID362 4,279 114 1.4% 0.582 0.409 0.675 0.423 0.644 0.420 0.674 0.433
Bank 41,188 52 11% 0.625 0.814 0.639 0.823 0.593 0.808 0.608 0.810
Chess (KRK) 28,056 40 0.01% 0.321 0.220 0.622 0.263 0.645 0.244 0.673 0.254
CMC 1,473 22 2.7% 0.559 0.402 0.580 0.458 0.589 0.474 0.600 0.414
Probe 64,759 82 6.4% 0.938 0.925 0.937 0.915 0.951 0.961 0.937 0.912
SolarFlare 1,066 41 4% 0.792 0.593 0.837 0.588 0.826 0.593 0.783 0.545
Windows S1 17,569 22 0.04% 0.992 0.302 0.996 0.602 0.984 0.618 0.996 0.675
BSD S1 76,903 29 0.02% 0.976 0.436 0.976 0.542 0.882 0.525 0.975 0.516
Linux S1 247,160 24 0.01% 0.887 0.340 0.887 0.299 0.821 0.264 0.887 0.407
Android S1 102 21 8.8% 0.754 0.740 0.731 0.821 0.826 0.848 0.860 0.861
Windows S2 11,151 30 0.07% 0.857 0.242 0.856 0.223 0.808 0.230 0.881 0.240
BSD S2 224,624 31 0.004% 0.936 0.249 0.904 0.211 0.873 0.191 0.917 0.186
Linux S2 282,087 25 0.01% 0.873 0.387 0.873 0.469 0.8240 0.306 0.856 0.358
Android S2 12,106 27 0.1% 0.884 0.328 0.930 0.780 0.906 0.305 0.907 0.629
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Figure 3: Compressed size and AUC or nDCG score vs. K for Bank and Probe datasets
CompreX and six for Krimp/OC3. (When there is a tie, we give
credit to both techniques.) Thus, despite its simplicity, the AVC∗
algorithm illustrates that a simple MDL-based compression model
together with MDL-based clustering yields a competitive anomaly
detection technique.
Effect of clustering on anomaly detection. For AVC∗, increasing the
number of clusters typically improves compression performance.
On the other hand, for OC3∗, the best compression often results
from K = 1 and typically fewer clusters are found. For the generic
datasets, increasing K does not always translate to improved anom-
aly detection performance, even if it improves compressed size. As
representative examples, consider the Bank and Probe datasets in
Figure 3. Both are compressed more effectively by AVC∗ for k = 16
or 20 while the best k value for OC3∗ is 1. Increasing K results in
improved median anomaly detection scores by AVC∗ while for the
other situations (Bank using OC3∗ and Probe using either algo-
rithm) increasing K leads to no improvement. The counterintuitive
results for Probe could result, for example, if there are several clus-
ters and all of the anomalies are close to one large cluster but far
from representative of the dataset as a whole.
We also consider the results obtained for theAPT security datasets.
We show the results for Scenario 1 in Figure 4, since the Scenario
2 results are similar, and because AVC∗ was more effective than
Krimp or CompreX on the Linux and Android datasets for Sce-
nario 1. The Windows and BSD datasets display a clear trend: for
AVC∗, decreasing compressed size corresponds to improved anom-
aly detection. OC3∗ and CompreX∗ show improvements in some
cases but these are more equivocal. For Linux scenario 1, AVC∗’s
anomaly detection performance again increases with larger K , cor-
responding to a decrease in compressed size. This is also the case
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Figure 4: Compressed size and AUC or nDCG score vs. K for APT scenario 1
for CompreX∗, while OC3∗ does obtain lower compressed size with
4–8 clusters but the increase in anomaly detection performance
is not as significant, with median AUC score nearly unchanged
and nDCG score increasing from 0.34 to 0.41. On the other hand,
for the Android dataset (the smallest of the APT datasets), AVC∗
obtains only small improvements in compressed size for K = 2
compared to K = 1, with some associated improvement in AUC
and nDCG scores, while both OC3∗ and CompreX∗ obtain minimal
compressed size at K = 1. Again, the general trend is that OC3∗
and CompreX∗ find fewer clusters.
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Figure 5: Runtime in seconds for general, APT scenario 1 and APT scenario 2 datasets
Overall, these results show that for AVC∗, there is usually a clear
relationship between finding more clusters, decreased compressed
size, and improved anomaly detection performance. For OC3∗ and
CompreX∗, there are improvements but they are not as pronounced,
possibly because the basic Krimp and CompreX models are already
sufficiently capable of adapting to heterogeneity, so that fewer
clusters are needed to find a good model of the data.
Running time. Figure 5 shows the average running time for each
technique on each dataset (with the exception of CompreX∗ which
we only report for a few datasets). Each run of AVC∗ or OC3∗
potentially considers all k-values up to 20 (and up to 2 or 4 in the
case of CompreX∗). A clear trend is that the clustering version of
each algorithm takes several times longer than the basic algorithm;
in the case of CompreX∗ the slowdown can be as much as a factor
of 10, making CompreX and CompreX∗ less competitive in terms
of performance. In general, we find that CompreX runs slower than
OC3, contrary to the results reported by Akoglu et al. [2], but this
may be due to differences in maturity of the version of Krimp used.
Generally, Krimp is faster than AVC, which is faster than CompreX,
and likewise for the clustering variants OC3∗, AVC∗ and CompreX∗
respectively. However, it should be recalled that each algorithm
is implemented in a different language (Python, C++ or Matlab)
so this may explain some of the differences. In particular, further
optimization or parallelization of AVC∗ should be effective, because
it is algorithmically much simpler than Krimp and there are many
unexploited opportunities for parallel processing.
5 RELATEDWORK
Mixture models and clustering have been used for anomaly de-
tection in numerical and mixed data; for example, the SmartSifter
algorithm [27] considers mixed categorical and numerical data, and
induces a different mixture model of numerical data for each combi-
nation of categorical attributes. SmartSifter also uses an MDL-like
logarithmic anomaly score. However, SmartSifter’s running time
grows exponentially in the number of categorical attributes, and
in practice, scales with the number of combinations of attributes
actually present in the data, which makes it unsuitable to datasets
with large numbers of categorical attributes. Another approach due
to Bouguessa aggregates the results of several anomaly detectors
and fits a mixture model to identify anomalous clusters [7].
Clustering techniques have been widely considered for numer-
ical (non-categorical) data, while clustering for categorical data
(which usually lacks natural metrics) has received much less study;
the main approaches considered so far include EM-style algorithms
for latent class inference or fitting discrete mixture models [6];
k-modes which performs clustering with respect to a dissimilarity
metric [12]; and MDL-based clustering [13, 25].
The MDL-based clustering approach we adopted is inspired by
and similar to those of Kontkanen et al. [13] and van Leeuwen et
al. [25], but differs from both in that we consider clustering based
on any MDL-based technique, whereas Kontkanen et al. consider
a minimax optimal encoding of mixtures of discrete distributions,
and van Leeuwen et al. consider Krimp as the base compressor
but their approach does not take into account the cost of encoding
the inferred classes. The latter do observe that their k-means-style
algorithm could be used with other compressors. Moreover, neither
approach has previously been considered as a basis for anomaly
detection, whereas previous work on MDL-based anomaly detec-
tion has not considered clustering or mixture model fitting. Our
work shows that this approach can improve anomaly detection
for a variety of MDL techniques, resulting in a new competitive
algorithm AVC∗ and in some cases improving on the performance
of Krimp/OC3 and CompreX reported in previous work.
Besides Krimp/OC3 and CompreX, anotherMDL-based approach
to anomaly detection is the UPC algorithm of Bertens et al. [5],
which uses a Krimp-style compression algorithm and then looks
for objects with unusual combinations of features. The anomaly
scores are not directly based on compressed sizes. To the best of our
knowledge the only previous work applying clustering to categori-
cal anomaly detection is the ROAD algorithm [22], and a variant
based on rough sets called Rough-ROAD [23]. Both algorithms per-
form clustering based on an ad-hoc metric on categorical data, and
neither is based on MDL. ROAD was shown to have better perfor-
mance than AVF [14] but was not compared with other anomaly
detection algorithms such as Krimp/OC3 or CompreX, while Rough-
ROAD was compared only with ROAD.
This work has been motivated by the observation that accord-
ing to the minimum description length principle, the best-fitting
model for some data is the one that minimizes the communication
cost of the data, including the cost of describing the chosen model.
However, to apply MDL requires deciding on a class of models
and encoding scheme for them. Moreover, allowing more complex
models increases the cost and algorithmic difficulty of searching
and fitting the best one. In the limit, we could consider arbitrary
compression algorithms as predictive models but then finding the
James Cheney, Xavier Gombau, Ghita Berrada, and Sidahmed Benabderrahmane
optimal one would be undecidable. Allowing mixture models and
fitting them using clustering is one strategy for enriching the model
space, which allows for the possibility of improved compression
(that is, better prediction), while remaining relatively algorithmi-
cally straightforward. The idea of CompreX, that is, partitioning the
columns of a dataset to enhance compression, is another approach.
It would be interesting to explore other points on the tradeoff curve
between model (and search space) complexity and compression
effectiveness.
The public datasets for anomaly detection are drawn from those
collected by Pang et al. [18, 19] in their work on feature selection and
anomaly detection. Their work demonstrates how unsupervised
feature selection could be used to improve categorical anomaly
detection, including for CompreX; this is an orthogonal direction
for improving anomaly detection effectiveness and performance,
and it may be interesting to study whether it can be combined with
clustering/mixture modeling.
Our main motivating application has been data gathered from
security exercises in a recent DARPA program. These datasets are
extracted from a much richer graph dataset in which operating
system processes, files, and other resources are represented as nodes,
and relationships between them as edges. Anomaly detection and
intrusion detection techniques have been developed and applied to
these datasets and studied by a number of papers [3, 4, 11, 15, 16, 20],
but there is as yet no commonly accepted public dataset of ground
truth annotations for evaluating different techniques; we used those
developed by the authors of [3, 4] for their binary feature datasets.
Comparing or combining our work with the above results obtained
by others would be a valuable exercise.
6 CONCLUSIONS
Anomaly detection over categorical data is challenging but has
received comparatively less attention than for continuous or nu-
merical data. The previous state of the art is to search for patterns
in the data that aid compression, for example using itemset mining
or partitioning the columns into mutually informative subsets, and
then use the codelength of each record as its anomaly score; accord-
ing to the MDL principle, the best model is the one that compresses
the data best, so once such a model is found, the anomalies are the
records compressed poorly by the model.
We observe that in heterogeneous datasets containing mixtures
of distinct kinds of records, existing techniques may miss oppor-
tunities to improve compression, and hence allowing mixtures of
models may improve compression and lead to better-fitting models
according to the MDL principle. Though the idea of fitting mix-
tures of models to data is not new, and has been used as a basis for
MDL-based clustering techniques, we propose the use of mixture
models and clustering algorithms to improve the performance of
MDL-based anomaly detection. We illustrated this general strategy
using three MDL-based anomaly detection techniques as the com-
ponents of mixture models: simple discrete AVC models, the Krimp
algorithm underlying OC3, and the CompreX algorithm.
Our results show that, in many cases, using a k-means-style al-
gorithm finds opportunities for improving compression compared
to using a single model. Moreover, we also show that mixture
modeling can improve the anomaly detection performance of exist-
ing algorithms such as Krimp/OC3 and CompreX, and even that
mixtures of simple models provide competitive anomaly detection
performance compared to unmixed Krimp or OC3 models. On the
other hand, performing iterative clustering to fit a mixture model
is more expensive computationally, and our choice of randomized
initialization of the clusters may leave room for further improve-
ment since it is well known that randomly initializing clusters is
not always the best strategy. Finally, we considered only the case of
batch, nonadaptive processing and it would also be interesting to
consider streaming, adaptive anomaly detection techniques based
on incremental clustering.
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